Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono hendropriyono

Date and Place of Birth: 7 May 1945, Yogyakarta.


  • Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN), Magelang, 1967
  • Australian Intelligence Course di Woodside (1971),
  • United States Army General Staff College di Fort Leavenworth, Amerika Serikat (1980),
  • Sekolah Staf dan Komando (Sesko) ABRI, 1989 with distinction (Wira Karya Nugraha).
  • Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional (Lemhannas).
  • Bachelors degree in administration at the Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi Negara (STIA-LAN),
  • Bachelors degree in Law at the Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Militer (STHM),
  • Bachelors degree in Economics at the Universitas Terbuka (UT) Jakarta
  • Bachelors degree in Industrial technics at the Universitas Jenderal Ahmad Yani (Unjani) Bandung
  • Masters degree in administration at the University of the City of Manila (Philippines)
  • Masters degree in Law at the STHM
  • Doctors degree (PhD, S3) at the University Gadjah Mada (UGM) Yogyakarta, cum laude, 2009.


  • 1968-1972 - Komandan Peleton Komando Pasukan Khusus TNI-AD di Magelang (2nd lieutenant) (Kopassus - Special Forces)
  • 1972-1974 - Komandan Kompi Prayuda Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha, the successor of Kopassus)
  • 1981-1983 - Komandan Detasemen Tempur 13
  • 1983-1985 - Wakil Asisten Personil Kopasandha merangkap sebagai Wakil Asisten Operasi
  • 1985-1987 - Asisten Intelijen Kodam V/Jaya (Intelligence Assistant, Jakarta)
  • 1987-1991 - Danrem 043/Garuda Hitam Lampung (Regional Military Commander, Lampung) (colonel)
  • 1991-1993 - Direktur D Badan Intelijen Strategis ABRI
  • 1993-1994 - Direktur A Badan Intelijen Strategis ABRI
  • 1993-1994 - Panglima Kodam V/Jaya (Military Commander Jakarta)
  • 1994-1996 - Komandan Kodiklat TNI AD (Commander Komando Pembina Doktrin, Pendidikan dan Latihan, Military doctrine development, educational and training command of the army)
  • 1996-1998 - Secretary for Operational Development Control (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan Republik Indonesia),
  • March-May 1998 - Minister for Transmigration Affairs (Menteri Transmigrasi dan Pemukiman Perambah Hutan (PPH) dalam Kabinet Pembangunan VII)
  • May 1998-October 1999 - Minister for Transmigration Affairs (Menteri Transmigrasi dan PPH dalam Kabinet Reformasi)
  • 1999 - Minister of Labour Affairs (Menteri Tenaga Kerja).
  • 2001-2004 - Head of the Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN) In the Cabinet Gotong Royong (as a functionary at the level of Minister).
  • 2014 - appointed as professor in the "intelligence science"  at the Intelligence State High School (Sekolah Tinggi Intelijen Negara).
  • Currently advisor in the Cabinet of President Joko Widodo.

Allegedly involved in

  • Timor Leste 1976 - as a captain on the ground (strikingly this episode is not mentioned in the official career), he participated in the Nanggala Operation, in the context of the occupational Kopassandha Operations; with a speical focus on recruiting and arming East Timorese militia (Special Platoon - Platon Khusus or TonSus) and psychological warfare (Source: Conboy, Ken: Kopassus, Inside Indonesia's Special Forces, Equinox Jakarta, 2003; page  266-270). Note that this author does not make a distinction between warfare and human rights violations. His presence in East Timor in 1975 is also metioned by Tanter, Richard et al.: Masters of Terror, Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor, 2006; page 97.
  • Talangsari 1989 - as colonel he supressed the orthodox Muslim group led by Warsidi in Lampung, South Sumatra. The number of casualties is said to be has never been proven. (Source: KontraS, 2008). "[In 2008] The National Human Rights Commission is investigating Hendropriyono in relation to the 1989 killings in Talangsari, Lampung region, Sumatra. Hendropriyono was regional commander in Lampung at the time when over 200 villagers were killed by his forces. He claimed they were fighting a radical Muslim sect while others maintained the issue was a land dispute."(Source: Wikileaks,). From this period his nickname of "The Buther of Lampung" originated (Source: Tanter et al. p. 97)
  • Timor Leste 1999: as Minister of Transmigration his role consisted in funding militias before the 1999 Referendum and funding the forced explusion of much of the population after it. (Source: Tanter, Richard et al. 2006; page 96).
  • The murder of Munir 2004 - as head of the State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) he is supposed to have been the puppeteer behind the murder of Munir. He has refused to be interrogated in the different trial procedures. (Source: KontraS, 2009). His involvement has been suggested by the US Embassy staff in September 2008: "In September 23 testimony, a witness offered evidence linking the former head of Indonesia's main intelligence agency (BIN) to the 2004 murder of human rights activist Munir. Testifying at the trial of a former BIN official, the witness talked about how the former head of BIN allegedly chaired meetings at which the murder plot was hatched. Despite this dramatic testimony, observers agree that more evidence is needed to link the former spy chief to the plot. Meanwhile, the defense team claims that a key witness has recanted his testimony, which if true could hurt the prosecution's case. (...) There has been important testimony in the trial of former BIN official Muchdi Purwopranjono for the murder of human rights activist Munir Said Thalib. (...) Testifying in South Jakarta District Court, Usman Hamid, a member of the 2004 Fact Finding Team appointed by President Yudhoyono to investigate the shocking murder, revealed that the team acquired a key document from a BIN agent. This document detailed how A.M. Hendropriyono, the former chief of BIN, was allegedly at the heart of the scheme to kill Munir." (Source: Wikileaks).

Investigations: none. Although many of the events mentioned above have been investigated, be it by the Attorney-General or the Komnas HAM, and often enough Henropriyono was called at least as a witness, he has always refused to testify.


In 1976 several units of special forces were deployed in East Timor (Source: Ken Conboy: Kopassus, Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, 2003, p. 266) Some were called sweet names (Tuti, Umi, Susi), others more formally numbered Nanggala 5, 6, etc. Tuti and Umi were mixed units (special forces and regular forces), Nanggala units were formed from the then called Kopassandha special forces. In September three Naggala units surrounded the village of Lebos, but the guerilla ambushes of Fretilin were stronger and Nanggala 12 for instance lost 10 of its 100 members. A new approach was suggested by a special forces captain, Hendropriyono, who first took his ideas to his commander, general Dading Kalbuadi. He explained the indirect rule that had been used by the Portuguese in Timor Leste, and by the Dutch in Java, by using local leaders. Dading suggested he propose his approach to the army headquarters in Cijantung (West Java). Here he met with major-general Benny Murdani and got his blessing to choose a dozen of prayudha soldiers for a small targeted unit. "I did not want men that would kill, but ones that would convince the Timorese not to kill. Above all I need men that would treat the Timorese with dignity." With this small unit he infiltrated into Timor in August 1976.

Surprisingly, he also included Timorese from the Apodeti and UDT who had been imprisoned by Fretilin in his unit. They had inside information. The group grew to some forty men, and the commander was not Hendropriyono, but a Timorese. Hendro was his deputy. This special platoon, Nanggala 13, achieved some major successes  in ambushes and intelligence initiatives with fake letters and in 1977 the experiment was included in the conventional approach by upgrading local civil guards, Hansip. "The first thing I did with an ex-Fretilin guerilla was to take away his rifle," he said, "and then upgrade it to a better weapon."

In 1999, as Minister of Transmigration and Resettlement, Hendropriyono's part in the East Timor nightmare consisted in funding militias before the ballot, and funding the forced expulsion of much of the population after it. His background in Kopassus gave him the motivation and the networks to do this (Source: Tanter et al. p. 96).

Soon after accepting his appointment as transmigration minister, he spoke in favour of a plan to stablish armed civilian militias all over the country, also in transmigration areas. They would be "multi-purpose," he said, and tasked with handling "anarchic" situations under armed forces supervision (Source: ibidem).

Hendropriyono also played a major role in the expulsion of a quarter of a million East Timorese into Indonesian West Timor in September 1999. Leaked communications intercepted by the Australian Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) show that Hendropriyono often communicated with Major General Zacky Makarim about this issue (Source: ibidem).